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A new Defense of Hedonism  
about Well- Being
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Lund University
According to hedonism about well- being, lives can go well or poorly for us just in 
virtue of our ability to feel pleasure and pain. Hedonism has had many advocates 
historically, but has relatively few nowadays. This is mainly due to three highly 
influential objections to it: The Philosophy of Swine, The experience Machine, and 
The resonance Constraint. In this paper, I attempt to revive hedonism. I begin by 
giving a precise new definition of it. I then argue that the right motivation for it is 
the ‘experience requirement’ (i.e., that something can benefit or harm a being only if 
it affects the phenomenology of her experiences in some way). next, I argue that he-
donists should accept a felt- quality theory of pleasure, rather than an attitude- based 
theory. Finally, I offer new responses to the three objections. Central to my responses 
are (i) a distinction between experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some pleasurable 
phenomenology) and being aware of that pleasure, and (ii) an emphasis on diversity 
in one’s pleasures.
1. Introduction
Lives can go well or poorly for individuals. What makes this so? According to 
hedonism, the answer is just pleasures and pains.1 Hedonism has many advo-
cates in the history of philosophy.2 But it has relatively few nowadays (in print, 
at least).3 This is mainly due to three highly influential objections to it, each of 
which is considered by many to be decisive: The Philosophy of Swine, The expe-
rience Machine, and The resonance Constraint.
1. In this essay, I will use ‘pain’ to refer to unpleasurable experiences more generally.
2. These include Democritus, Aristippus, epicurus, Jeremy Bentham, and J. S. Mill. Others 
whose views seem at times to come close to hedonism include Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, 
Hume, Kant, and Sidgwick.
3. notable exceptions include Feldman (2004), Crisp (2006), Heathwood (2006), and Bradley 
(2009). note that Heathwood counts as both a hedonist and a desire- based theorist of well- being 
due to his desire- based theory of pleasure.
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In this paper, I will provide a new defense of hedonism. I will start by giving 
a precise new definition of it (Section 2). I will then explain what I consider to 
be the most compelling motivation for it (Section 3). next, I will argue that he-
donism should be paired with a felt- quality theory of pleasure, rather than an 
attitude- based one (Section 4). Finally, I will offer new responses to the three 
objections mentioned above (Section 5, Section 6, and Section 7). I will conclude 
by neatly setting out the version of hedonism we will have ended up with, and 
summarising its key virtues (Section 8).
2. Defining Hedonism
Philosophers often distinguish between two kinds of well- being:
1.  Momentary well- being, or how well off someone was at a particular mo-
ment in her life (say, the present moment, or 7.34am, July 10, 1993, etc.), 
and
2.  Extended- period well- being, or how well off someone was during a par-
ticular period or stretch of time— say, a day, a week, a month, an en-
tire chapter of her life, or (in the limiting case) her life considered as a 
whole (lifetime well- being).4
In this paper, I will assume that lifetime well- being is the normatively significant 
notion. That is, only lifetime well- being is itself worth promoting for someone’s 
sake, and an ultimate source of self- interested reasons for someone. The other kinds of 
well- being, to the extent that they matter for someone at all, matter only deriva-
tively, by having implications (either constitutive or causal) for her lifetime well- 
being.5 Consequently, I will treat the following as the fundamental question in 
the philosophy of well- being:
What determines the various respects in which someone’s life consid-
ered as a whole went well or poorly for her?
Given this way of understanding what is at issue, a natural definition of he-
donism is as the view that the various respects in which someone was well or 
4. For a small sample of those who draw this distinction, see Bradley (2009), Bramble (2014), 
Broome (2004), Brink (2010), Campbell (2015), Dorsey (2009), Feldman (2004), Griffin (1986), 
Heathwood (2011), Kauppinen (2011), McMahan (2002), Portmore (2007), raibley (2012), and Vel-
leman (2000).
5. See Griffin (1986), Brink (2010), and Bramble (2016).
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poorly off in her life considered as a whole are fully determined by her pleasures 
and pains. More precisely:
Hedonism. Any two beings who are identical in what pleasures and pains 
they felt during their lives must also be identical in any respects in which 
they were well and poorly off in their lives considered as wholes.
It may be objected that this definition is not precise enough, for it counts what 
Feldman refers to as dolorism— i.e., “the view that pain is the Good and pleasure is 
the Bad” (Feldman 2004: 182)— as a version of hedonism. However, like Feldman 
(whose own proposed definition of hedonism shares this implication), I do not 
find this too worrying. If you are worried by it, feel free to add to the above defi-
nition “where, in some suitable sense, pleasure is the good and pain is the bad”.6
Finally, I will assume here the following conception of benefiting and harming:
Benefiting and Harming. To benefit somebody is to make her better off in 
some respect in her life considered as a whole than she would otherwise 
have been. To harm somebody is to make her worse off in some respect 
in her life considered as a whole than she would otherwise have been.7
To work out whether some particular event benefited a person, it is necessary 
and sufficient to compare her actual whole life with the whole life she would have 
had had this event not occurred, and see if she is better off in any respect in the 
former than in the latter.
On this assumption, hedonism implies the following view about benefiting 
and harming (which will be important later on, in Section 3):
Hedonism about Benefiting and Harming (HBH): Benefiting and harming 
just consist in affecting pleasures and pains in various ways.
now that it is clear what I think we should mean by hedonism, let us turn to the 
question of why hedonism is attractive.
3. The Appeal of Hedonism
Many motivations have been offered for hedonism. Most of these, it is fair to say, 
are not very convincing.8 But one seems to me highly compelling:
6. To further sharpen this definition would needlessly complicate matters to come.
7. While popular, this comparativist conception of benefiting and harming is not without its 
critics. See, for example, Harman (2004) and Shriffin (1999).
8. For an excellent discussion, see Dorsey (2011).
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The Experience Requirement. Something can benefit or harm a being only if 
it affects her experiences in some way— specifically, their phenomenology 
(or ‘what it is like’ to be having them).9
If the experience requirement is true, then hedonism seems likely to be true as 
well. This is because:
1.  If things must affect someone’s experiences in order to benefit or 
harm her, this is likely because benefiting and harming just consist in 
affecting people’s experiences in various ways.
2.  If benefiting and harming just consist in affecting people’s experienc-
es in various ways, this is likely because they just consist in affecting 
people’s pleasures and pains specifically (HBH from above).
I will take (2) for granted. But I want to consider an important objection to (1). It 
may be suggested that, while it is indeed necessary in order to benefit or harm 
someone that one affect her experiences in some way, more is required. For ex-
ample, it may be that in order to benefit someone, one must give her, not only a 
pleasure, but, say, actual fame (or friendship, health, success, desire- satisfaction, 
or whatever it may be). Such a view does not count as hedonistic on my defini-
tion (since, according to such a view, benefiting and harming do not just consist 
in affecting people’s pleasures and pains in various ways), but it seems to satisfy 
the experience requirement.
However, on closer inspection, such a view does not in fact satisfy this re-
quirement. Suppose that somebody, having been given pleasure and fame (and 
so, on such a view, having been benefited) then loses the fame, but retains the 
pleasure. On the view in question, the loss of this fame would constitute a harm 
to this person, since she no longer has both the pleasure and the fame. But her 
experiences need not have been affected in any way (if, for example, she was 
ignorant of the loss of her fame). So, on such a view, there could be benefits or 
harms without changes in experiences.
I will take it, then, that not only (2), but (1) also, is true. The crucial question 
now is Why believe the experience requirement? Many people (including myself) 
feel that something that has no effect on a person’s experiences does not ‘touch’ 
or ‘get to’ this person in the sort of way required for something to benefit or 
harm someone.10 But many others claim not to have this intuition.11 Is there an 
 9. Here, I paraphrase Sumner (1996).
10. For useful discussion, see Sumner (1996) and Kagan (1992).
11. For discussion, see Kagan (1994).
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argument for the experience requirement that might sway these others? I believe 
there is. It is this:
1.  If something could benefit or harm someone without affecting her ex-
periences (say, fame, success, desire- satisfaction, or whatever it may 
be), then it could do so even after she is dead.
2.  nothing can benefit or harm us after we are dead (there can be no 
posthumous benefits or harms).
Therefore,
3.  nothing can benefit or harm someone without affecting her experi-
ences.
Let me say something in defense of each premise, starting with (2).12 Consider 
Vincent Van Gogh, emily Dickinson, nick Drake, emily Brontë, and John Ken-
nedy Toole, each of whose lives were all- things- considered pretty unfortunate 
(or, at the very least, not especially fortunate)— full of loneliness, illness (physi-
cal and mental), fractured family relationships, and perhaps worst of all, a deep 
despair that came from knowing that their artistic works, to which they had 
devoted their lives, were almost totally unappreciated by their contemporaries. 
each of them, however, went on to achieve tremendous posthumous success, 
fame, and desire- satisfaction (since each dearly wanted their works to be ap-
preciated). now, if posthumous events could be good or bad for one, then surely 
the truly enormous posthumous success, fame, or desire- satisfaction that these 
individuals achieved would mean that their lives were not so unfortunate after 
all. But it doesn’t. (Intuitively, this is part of the reason their lives were tragic.) 
Therefore, there can be no posthumous benefits or harms.13
now consider (1). The burden here seems clearly to be on those who would 
deny (1) to answer the following question:
If the contribution to our well- being of success, fame, desire- satisfaction, 
or whatever it is, does not depend on our experiences being affected, 
12. This is necessary because, while many people find it simply obvious that there can be no 
posthumous benefits and harms, many philosophers claim to have the contrary intuition (and to 
have it quite forcefully). For a defense of the possibility of posthumous harms, see Lukas (2009).
13. This argument, to be sure, is not decisive. It is possible that posthumous events could be 
good or bad for us, but only ever slightly so. If this were true, then the posthumous success, fame, 
or desire- satisfaction of Van Gogh, Dickinson, etc., might be good for these people, even though 
their lives remain all- things- considered unfortunate. But in order to believe this, we would need 
some principled reason to believe that posthumous benefits and harms could only ever be slight. I 
cannot myself think of what such a reason could be.
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then why should it matter whether we are still alive or not for this contribution 
to be made?
Some have suggested that it is because death removes the subject, and without 
a subject there is no- one left to be harmed. However, even after death, there re-
mains a subject in one sense: the person who once existed. If it is replied that this 
is insufficient, that there must continue to be a living, breathing being for there to 
be a subject of harm, then we are back with the original question: Why must one 
still exist in order to be harmed by things if their harming one does not require 
their affecting one’s experiences?
The experience requirement, by contrast, provides a very natural explana-
tion of why there can be no posthumous benefits and harms. What, after all, is 
death? On a plausible conception, it is just the permanent cessation of one’s ex-
periences. Death, then, we can say, ends one’s ability to be benefited and harmed 
precisely because it is the end of one’s experiences, and benefiting and harming 
require affecting one’s experiences.
I conclude that we have, in the experience requirement, a very powerful rea-
son to believe hedonism.
4. The Nature of Pleasure
What should a hedonist say about the nature of pleasure and pain? There are 
two main competing theories: felt- quality and attitude- based ones. According to 
felt- quality theories,
some bit of phenomenology counts as a pleasure or a pain just in virtue 
of its phenomenology (i.e., ‘what it is like’ to be experiencing it).14
By contrast, attitude- based theories say that
some bit of phenomenology counts as a pleasure or a pain just in virtue 
of the subject’s attitude toward it (e.g., whether it is liked, wanted, etc.).15
On the most sophisticated attitude- based theory, Heathwood’s,
some bit of phenomenology counts as a pleasure just in case its subject 
has an intrinsic de re desire at time t that it be occurring at t.16
14. For defenses of felt- quality theories of pleasure, see Crisp (2006), Kagan (1992), Broad 
(1930), Duncker (1941), Smuts (2011), and Bramble (2013).
15. For defenses of attitude- based theories, see Alston (1967), Parfit (1984), Carson (2000), 
Feldman (2004), and Heathwood (2007).
16. Heathwood (2007). note that this is my formulation of Heathwood’s theory, not a direct 
quote.
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Felt- quality theories seem to have commonsense on their side. To many, it seems 
that we like or want pleasures because they are pleasurable, and hate and seek to 
avoid pains because they are painful. Why do I like or want the feeling of orgasm? 
Intuitively, it is because this feeling is pleasurable (or feels good). It does not feel 
good because I want it. Why would I want it if not because it feels good? Similarly, 
why do I hate the feeling of headache? It is because it is painful. It is not painful 
because I hate it. What is the feeling of headache even like without the painful-
ness? And why would I hate that? Attitude- based theories seem to get the order 
of explanation the wrong way around.
Despite this, most philosophers today favour attitude- based theories. This 
is mainly due to a widespread belief that felt- quality theories have been refuted 
by what has come to be known as the heterogeneity objection. This objection is as 
follows:
1. Felt- quality theories entail that all pleasures feel alike in some way.
2. All pleasures do not feel alike in some way.
Therefore,
3. Felt- quality theories are false.
Feldman, for example, writes:
Consider the warm, dry, slightly drowsy feeling of pleasure that you get 
while sunbathing on a quiet beach. By way of contrast, consider the cool, 
wet, invigorating feeling of pleasure that you get when drinking some 
cold, refreshing beer on a hot day. . . . [They] do not feel at all alike. (2004: 
79)
He and others conclude that felt- quality theories are unacceptable.
Attitude- based theories, by contrast, have no trouble accounting for the felt 
diversity of pleasures. What does a pleasure of sunbathing have in common with 
one of drinking a cold beer on a hot day? Simply that its subject happens to like 
it or want it to be occurring.
I believe a hedonist should accept a felt- quality theory.17 This is for the fol-
lowing reason:
Only hedonism paired with a felt- quality theory is consistent with the 
right motivation for hedonism, the experience requirement.
17. note that I wish to remain neutral in this paper on the question of which felt- quality theory 
is best.
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Suppose hedonism is true, and some attitude- based theory of pleasure is also 
true. In this case, there could be changes in well- being without changes in phe-
nomenology. Why is this? It is because, on attitude- based theories, there can be 
changes in a person’s pleasures and pains without changes in her phenomenol-
ogy. On attitude- based theories, it is enough for there to be a change in one’s 
pleasures and pains that there be some change in whether or the extent to which 
one intrinsically wants some bit of one’s current phenomenology to be going on. 
For example, a bit of phenomenology that is for me right now neither pleasur-
able nor painful could become pleasurable simply in virtue of my coming to 
intrinsically want it to be going on.
It may be objected that, while it is true that, on attitude- based theories, there 
can be changes in pleasures and pains without changes in phenomenology, a 
hedonist is not committed to the view that every change in pleasures or pains 
affects well- being. A hedonist could say that it is only changes in pleasures and 
pains that do happen to involve changes in phenomenology that are ones that 
can affect a person’s well- being. But this is hardly satisfactory. Such a hedonist 
would lack an explanation of why the experience requirement is true. She could 
not hold the appealing view that benefiting and harming require a change in 
phenomenology because hedonism is true.
A different response on behalf of attitude- based theorists is that intrinsically 
desiring some particular bit of phenomenology to be going on is a state that 
itself possesses a certain kind of phenomenology. If this is true, then changes in 
whether or the extent to which one wants some bit of one’s phenomenology to 
be going on does necessarily involve some change in one’s phenomenology. But 
even assuming that some desires can have phenomenology of their own (so- 
called ‘intrinsic phenomenology’18), and that the intrinsic desire that is involved 
in making some bit of phenomenology count as a pleasure is among them, this 
would undermine the key motivation for holding an attitude- based theory in the 
first place, the heterogeneity objection. It would suggest that all pleasures do feel 
alike in some way— they would all share the phenomenology that is involved in 
the sort of desire that makes some bit of phenomenology count as a pleasure.19
either way, then, the hedonist is going to have to contend with the hetero-
geneity objection. In light of this, it seems best simply to embrace the more com-
monsensical of the two kinds of theories— i.e., felt- quality ones— and attempt to 
respond to the heterogeneity objection.
now, there is, I believe, a good response to the heterogeneity objection. This 
18. For discussion, see Tye (1995) and Bayne and Montague (2011).
19. Admittedly, it is possible that what it is like to desire that a particular bit of phenomenol-
ogy be occurring depends in part on the nature of the latter phenomenology, so that, on the view 
under consideration, there would not necessarily be any common feel to all pleasures. However, I 
will not further consider this possibility here.
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is that our knowledge of (the intrinsic features of) our own phenomenology is 
far from infallible. not only can we have false beliefs about it, there are aspects of 
it that can be hard or even impossible for us to have true beliefs about. In a book 
and series of fine papers, eric Schwitzgebel argues that
we make gross, enduring mistakes about even the most basic features of 
our currently ongoing conscious experience (or “phenomenology”), even 
in favorable circumstances of careful reflection, with distressing regular-
ity . . . The introspection of current conscious experience, far from being 
secure, nearly infallible, is faulty, untrustworthy, and misleading— not 
just possibly mistaken, but massively and pervasively. (2008: 247– 259)
Schwitzgebel presents cases of mistaken beliefs about one’s own visual imagery 
(Schwitzgebel 2002), auditory experience (Schwitzgebel 2000), and emotional ex-
perience. Concerning emotions, he writes,
Is emotional consciousness simply the experience of one’s bodily arousal, 
and other bodily states, as William James (1981 [1890]) seems to suggest? 
Or, as most people think, can it include, or even be exhausted by, some-
thing less literally visceral? Is emotional experience consistently located 
in space (for example, particular places in the interior of one’s head and 
body)? Can it have color— for instance, do we sometimes literally “see 
red” as part of being angry? Does it typically come and pass in a few mo-
ments (as Buddhists sometimes suggest), or does it tend to last awhile (as 
my english- speaking friends more commonly say)? If you’re like me, you 
won’t find all such questions trivially easy. You’ll agree that someone— 
perhaps even yourself— could be mistaken about some of them, despite 
sincerely attempting to answer them, despite a history of introspection, 
despite maybe years of psychotherapy or meditation or self- reflection. 
(2008: 249– 250)
He offers an example of a husband who is entirely oblivious to his own feelings 
of anger while doing the washing up:
My wife mentions that I seem to be angry about being stuck with the dish-
es again (despite the fact that doing the dishes makes me happy?). I deny 
it. I reflect; I sincerely attempt to discover whether I’m angry— I don’t 
just reflexively defend myself but try to be the good self- psychologist my 
wife would like me to be— and still I don’t see it. I don’t think I’m angry. 
But I’m wrong, of course, as I usually am in such situations: My wife 
reads my face better than I introspect. Maybe I’m not quite boiling inside, 
but there’s plenty of angry phenomenology to be discovered if I knew 
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better how to look. Or do you think that every time we’re wrong about 
our emotions, those emotions must be nonconscious, dispositional, not 
genuinely felt? Or felt and perfectly apprehended phenomenologically 
but somehow nonetheless mislabeled? Can’t I also err more directly? 
(2008: 252)
Daniel Haybron, too, argues that
there are good reasons for doubting that any of us have a firm grasp on 
the quality of our experience of life, in particular its affective character. 
Possibly, many of us are profoundly ignorant about such matters, to the 
point that we often don’t know whether we are happy or unhappy, or 
even whether our experience is pleasant or unpleasant. (2007: 395)
He asks us to consider, for example,
how a tense person will often learn of it only when receiving a massage, 
whereas stressed or anxious individuals may discover their emotional state 
only by attending to the physical symptoms of their distress. (2007: 398)
He goes on:
Perhaps you have lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad 
bearing. If so, you might have found that, with time, you entirely ceased 
to notice the racket. But occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you 
did notice the sudden, glorious silence. You might also have noted, first, a 
painful headache, and second, that you’d had no idea how obnoxious the 
noise was— or that it was occurring at all— until it ceased. But obnoxious 
it was, and all the while it had been, unbeknownst to you, fouling your 
experience as you went about your business. In short, you’d been having 
an unpleasant experience without knowing it. Moreover, you might well 
have remained unaware of the noise even when reflecting on whether 
you were enjoying yourself: the problem here is ignorance— call it re-
flective blindness— and not, as some have suggested, the familiar sort 
of inattentiveness we find when only peripherally aware of something. 
In such cases we can bring our attention to the experience easily and at 
will. Here the failure of attention is much deeper: we are so lacking in awareness 
that we can’t attend to the experience, at least not without prompting (as occurs 
when the noise suddenly changes). (2007: 400– 401)
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If these philosophers are right, then our inability to introspect a common feel 
to all pleasures should not weigh all that heavily against felt- quality theories.20
I conclude that hedonism should be paired with a felt- quality, rather than an 
attitude- based, theory of pleasure and pain.
5. The Philosophy of Swine
The first objection to hedonism I want to consider is The Philosophy of Swine. 
J.S. Mill put it like this:
To suppose that life has . . . no higher end than pleasure— no better and 
nobler object of desire and pursuit— [is] utterly mean and groveling . . . a 
doctrine worthy only of swine.21
Feldman makes the objection vivid in his example of Porky, a human being 
who
spends all his time in the pigsty, engaging in the most obscene sexual 
activities imaginable . . . Porky derives great pleasure from these activi-
ties and the feelings they stimulate. Let us imagine that Porky happily 
carries on like this for many years. Imagine also that Porky has no human 
friends, has no other sources of pleasure, and has no interesting knowl-
edge. Let us also imagine that Porky somehow avoids pains— he is never 
injured by the pigs, he does not come down with any barnyard diseases, 
he does not suffer from loneliness or boredom. (2004: 40)
Porky’s life, for all its pleasures, does not seem high in well- being (compared 
with a normal human life). Importantly, this seems true no matter how long it lasts 
for. But how can a hedonist accept this?
We can formulate the worry more precisely as follows:
1.  Hedonism entails that a pig’s life (or a human life like Porky’s) could 
be high in well- being (compared with a normal human life).
2.  A pig’s life (or a human life like Porky’s) could not be high in well- 
being (compared with a normal human life).
Therefore,
3. Hedonism is false.
20. For further discussion, see Bramble (2013).
21. Mill (1998 Chapter II).
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Some hedonists have proposed biting the bullet— i.e., accepting that Porky is 
well off (compared with a normal human being). They have tried to explain away 
our intuition to the contrary in a number of ways. Heathwood, for example, sug-
gests that we are inclined to feel this way only because we see that Porky’s life 
is lacking in certain other respects, like “dignity, virtue, or achievement” (2006: 
553), and our awareness of this is causing confusion.
But this is an extremely large bullet to bite. There is, I believe, a better re-
sponse. A hedonist can explain why a life like Porky’s is not high in well- being 
(compared with a normal human life). There are two reasons that it is not. Let 
me explain them in turn.
The first reason is that, while a Porky life contains many pleasures (and, let us 
assume, no pains), bodily pleasures like Porky’s aren’t especially pleasurable. The 
most pleasurable kinds of pleasures are not bodily ones, but rather some of the 
pleasures of love, learning, aesthetic appreciation, and so on. Porky is missing 
out on these highly pleasurable pleasures.
To attempt to convince you of this, I want to invoke a distinction from the 
previous section, between feeling or experiencing a pleasure (i.e., having some 
particular pleasurable phenomenology) and being aware of it. now, certain plea-
sures, it seems, can be hard to attend to or to become aware of, while others can 
be difficult to miss. With this in mind, we can distinguish two senses in which a 
pleasure may be intense:
1. In the sense of being easy to attend to or even hard to miss.
2.  In the sense of being highly pleasurable (i.e., being pleasurable to a 
high degree).22
Bodily pleasures, I want to suggest, are often extremely intense in the first sense. 
The pleasures of orgasm, massage, sunbathing, and so on, are (for most of us, in 
most cases) easy to attend to, and even hard to miss. It does not follow, however, 
that they are intense in the second sense, of being highly pleasurable. While the 
pleasures of orgasm, for example, typically feature prominently in one’s con-
sciousness, it may be that what one sees of them at these times is all that exists 
of them. By contrast, what one sees of the pleasures of love, learning, aesthetic 
appreciation, and so on, when one introspects them, may be merely the tip of the 
phenomenological iceberg, so to speak. There may be far more to these pleasures 
than typically meets the introspective eye.
So far I have identified these things merely as possibilities. Is there any rea-
son to think that they are actually so? I believe there is. Consider some of the key 
22. For related discussion, see Kagan (1992).
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factors that go into determining how easy it is to attend to or introspect a given 
pleasure:
1.  Whether the pleasure has (or is associated with) a particular bodily location, 
or rather permeates one’s entire experiential field. Permeating pleasures, 
other things being equal, are harder to attend to than pleasures hav-
ing a particular bodily location.23
2.  How the pleasure begins and develops. Pleasures that begin in only a 
small amount and then build up slowly over time are, other things 
being equal, harder to attend to than pleasures that come on sudden-
ly.24
3.  Whether the pleasure is a flow pleasure (i.e., involves mental absorption in 
some thing or activity). Flow pleasures are, other things being equal, 
harder to attend to than non- flow pleasures.25
now, the pleasures of love, learning, and aesthetic appreciation, for the most 
part, are permeating pleasures (they lack specific bodily locations), build up 
slowly (as one gets to know a person, improves or builds upon one’s knowledge 
or understanding of the world, or makes one’s way through a novel, film, piece 
of music, etc.), and require that one’s mind be somewhere other than on the plea-
sure (say, on one’s friend, on the feature of the world one is learning about, or on 
the novel, film, or piece of music in question).26 As Sidgwick writes,
The pleasures of thought and study can only be enjoyed in the highest 
degree by those who have an ardour of curiosity which carries the mind 
temporarily away from self and its sensations. In all kinds of Art, again, the 
exercise of the creative faculty is attended by intense and exquisite plea-
sures: but it would seem that in order to get them, one must forget them: 
the genuine artist at work seems to have a predominant and temporarily 
absorbing desire for the realisation of his ideal of beauty. (1913: 49)
For these reasons, it seems plausible to think that there may be significantly more 
to the pleasures in question than one can easily introspect or attend to.
By contrast, bodily pleasures tend to have specific bodily locations, come on 
suddenly (as one eats, gets drunk, is caressed by one’s lover, takes a drug, or 
collapses exhausted into bed), and in general do not require that one’s mind be 
23. For more on permeation, see Haybron (2007) and Bramble (2013).
24. See Haybron (2007).
25. See Csikszentmihalyi (1990).
26. There are exceptions. My claim is meant as a generalisation.
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somewhere other than on the pleasure— indeed, with bodily pleasures, attend-
ing to them often enhances the pleasure. It therefore seems reasonable to think 
that there is little or no more to most such pleasures than one can easily intro-
spect or attend to.
Turn now to the second reason that a Porky life is not high in well- being 
(compared with a normal human life). This has to do with the value for one of 
diversity in one’s pleasures. There are two parts to this reason:
1.  Purely repeated pleasures— i.e., pleasures that introduce nothing qual-
itatively new in terms of pleasurableness into a person’s life— add 
nothing in and of themselves to her lifetime well- being.27
2.  A life of purely bodily pleasures, unlike one involving some of the 
pleasures of love, learning, aesthetic appreciation, etc., can involve 
very little qualitative diversity in pleasures. Its pleasures quickly be-
come ‘just more of the same’.
Let me defend these two claims, starting with (2).
I want to begin my defense of (2) by explaining why there is a great deal of 
qualitative diversity available in the pleasures of love, learning, and aesthetic 
appreciation. Consider, first, the pleasures of love. What it is like to come to 
know or love a particular person is not just the same as what it is like to come 
to know or love someone else. each person is unique, making the pleasures as-
sociated with friendships and relationships qualitatively unique for the people 
involved. Moreover, there are many qualitatively new pleasures that are made 
possible by friendships and relationships as they evolve or deepen over time, 
or as those who are involved in them overcome challenges or share new experi-
ences together.
Consider, next, the pleasures of learning. These also do not consist of just the 
same kind of pleasure (say, a warm glow or ‘zing!’) over and over again every 
time one learns a new fact. On the contrary, they have quite a different phenom-
enal character depending on what one has learned, the particular way in which 
one’s mind has been opened up, and how one’s new knowledge or understand-
ing fits with what one already knows. Compare, for example, the pleasures of 
learning algebra with those of learning to ride a bike, watching David Attenbor-
ough’s “The Life of Birds”, understanding the basic problems of philosophy, 
or understanding some of the proposed solutions to these problems, etc. All of 
these, intuitively, are qualitatively very different.
Finally, consider the pleasures of appreciating great works of art, music, 
27. For a related suggestion, see Lemos (2010). See also Brentano (1973). note that I am here 
opposing what some have termed ‘quantitative’ hedonism— see Weijers (2011) and Moore (2013).
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literature, etc. Great novels and films typically transport one to places that no 
other work does, or involve characters that are so realistic that they are, like real 
people, unique, or offer insights or explore ideas in ways that no other work 
does. The pleasures associated with such works are correspondingly unique. 
enjoyment of Hitchcock’s Vertigo is very different from enjoyment of Kubrick’s 
2001: A Space Odyssey, which is very different again from enjoyment of a differ-
ent Kubrick film, say, Full Metal Jacket. Similar remarks apply to great paintings, 
sculptures, and musical compositions. enjoyment of a Chopin nocturne differs 
greatly from enjoyment of The Beatles’s She Loves You, which in turn differs 
greatly from enjoyment of a different Beatles song, say, I Am The Walrus. More-
over, one’s enjoyment of a particular piece of music may itself deepen or evolve 
in wonderful ways over the course of weeks, months, or even years. One mark of 
a great film, novel, or song is that it tends to reward re- watching, re- reading, or 
re- listening. One finds there is often more to discover— including qualitatively 
new pleasures— each time one returns to it.
Turn now to purely bodily pleasures. While there is certainly some quali-
tative diversity available in these— the pleasures of sex, for example, differ in 
character from those of sunbathing— further instances of each of these sorts of 
pleasures seem rapidly to become just more of the same.
Heathwood (personal correspondence) objects to my claim as follows:
We can stipulate that Porky does all different things with the pigs, that 
he does these things on all different farms with all new scenery, that he 
eventually moves on to other animals, that he eventually starts supple-
menting the experiences with bondage equipment and drugs (all the 
while managing never to get bored, addicted, or filled with despair).
I accept that by changing Porky’s life in these ways we might succeed in adding 
some new kinds of pleasures to it. But I doubt we can add very many. Porky’s 
pleasures, after all, are not due to the unique personal characteristics of the pigs 
(as they might be if he were to have loving relationships with them), the beauty 
of the scenery (as they might be if he were any kind of aesthete), or his learning 
anything about himself or deepening in his understanding of the world. Any at-
tempt to diversify Porky’s pleasures by introducing him to new pigs, new settings 
for his sordid activities, and so on, would succeed in giving him, for the most part, 
merely new vehicles for what would be qualitatively the same pleasures.
Suppose this is granted. What can be said in defense of (1), the claim that 
purely repeated pleasures add nothing in and of themselves to lifetime well- 
being? Surely, you might insist, some purely repeated pleasures add at least 
something to some people’s lifetime well- being. Is there really nothing of value 
for, say, Mary, in her enjoyment of her morning coffee, an enjoyment that pre-
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sumably is qualitatively identical each time? Or suppose I am walking down the 
street and pass my favourite flower (a gardenia), inhale, and greatly enjoy the 
scent. I may have experienced this pleasure a hundred times before, so often, in 
fact, that there is now nothing new about it. Still, the experience is glorious. I sa-
vour it, and am glad to be alive. Is this pleasure really of no worth for me because 
it has happened before?
There are two things to say in response to this worry. The first is that many 
pleasures that might seem on first glance to be purely repeated ones involve sub-
tly new elements. They may be deeper or more intense than previous instances 
(as can happen, for example, when we become appreciators of something like 
coffee, wine, beer, certain kinds of food, etc.). Alternatively, the new context in 
which they are felt may add a new dimension to them. For example, what may 
seem to be a purely repeated pleasure of drinking coffee may be different if one 
is drinking the same coffee in a new setting (say, an interesting new cafe), with 
new friends, or with old friends but while discussing interesting new topics.
The second thing to say is that even pleasures that are purely repeated ones, 
while they add nothing in and of themselves to lifetime well- being, can have con-
siderable instrumental value for us. Such pleasures can relax or stimulate us. 
They can rejuvenate or sustain us. They can help to clear our heads. They can 
vividly remind us of what pleasure can feel like, and so give us a hint of what 
qualitatively new pleasures may be on the horizon. They can help to make our 
lives interesting for us in the gaps between qualitatively new kinds of pleasures. 
They can, in all these ways, be a sort of oil for our joints. Without a good deal 
of purely repeated pleasures, we may never make it to the new ones. We must 
be careful not to confuse a pleasure’s having instrumental value for one with its 
adding in and of itself to one’s lifetime well- being.
I want to conclude this section by considering two important objections to 
my claim about the value of diversity in one’s pleasures. The first is that, while 
diversity in pleasures is valuable, I have given the wrong account of why it is 
valuable. Diversity is valuable, it may be suggested, just in order to preserve 
the pleasurableness of one’s experiences. Without some diversity, we tend to get 
bored or lose interest in things. The Beatles’s music may be wonderful, but if one 
listens only to The Beatles, one will soon cease to enjoy their music as much as 
one did.
I accept that diversity is valuable for this reason. However, this is compatible 
with its having the other sort of value for us as well. Indeed, I suspect (though 
I admit this is pure speculation) that part of the reason we tend to lose interest 
in or gain less pleasure from things we have had a great deal of contact with 
lately is that we are implicitly aware that there are now fewer qualitatively new 
pleasures to be had from the thing in question, and so its value for us is reduced.
The second objection I want to consider is that a hedonist cannot consistently 
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assign to diversity in one’s pleasures the value I have assigned to it here. In 
particular, a hedonist cannot maintain that purely repeated pleasures have no 
value for a person. This is because a hedonist must say that the amount a given 
pleasure adds to one’s lifetime well- being is directly proportional to its degree 
of pleasurableness. Otherwise, she is appealing to considerations other than the 
pleasurableness of a pleasure.
However, there is no good reason to think that a hedonist must appeal only 
to the degree to which a pleasure is pleasurable in explaining its value for one. So 
long as a candidate explanation does not breach what I have called the experi-
ence requirement, there is no reason a hedonist cannot embrace it. And there is 
nothing in my proposal about diversity that breaches this requirement.
I conclude that hedonism can accommodate our intuition that a life like Por-
ky’s, no matter how long it lasts, is not high in well- being (compared with a 
normal human life).
6. The Experience Machine
In The Examined Life, robert nozick writes:
Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of 
experiences) you might desire. When connected to this experience ma-
chine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or bringing 
about world peace or loving someone and being loved in return. You 
can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they feel “from the 
inside.” You can program your experiences for . . . the rest of your life. If 
your imagination is impoverished, you can use the library of suggestions 
extracted from biographies and enhanced by novelists and psycholo-
gists. You can live your fondest dreams “from the inside.” Would you 
choose to do this for the rest of your life? . . . Upon entering, you will not 
remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined by realizing 
they are machine- produced. (1989: 104)
If hedonism were true, nozick suggests, then “plugging in would constitute the 
very best life, or tie for being the best, because all that matters about a life is how 
it feels from the inside” (1989: 105). Intuitively, however, nozick continues, this 
is not so— there are alternatives that would be better for one. Therefore, hedo-
nism is false.28
28. For a defense of this interpretation of nozick, see Bramble (forthcoming). Others formu-
late nozick’s objection differently. See, for example, Weijers and Schouten (2013) and Feldman 
(2011).
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What should we make of nozick’s argument? The standard response to it by 
hedonists is to accept that plugging in would be best for one, and then to try to 
explain why some of us are inclined to feel otherwise. For example, some may be 
failing to keep firmly and vividly in mind various important features of the case 
(such as that one’s experiences in the machine would truly be reality- quality, or 
that the machine is guaranteed not to malfunction). Others may be allowing their 
intuitions concerning related matters (say, whether it is best simpliciter or morally 
permissible for one to plug in to the machine) to interfere with or contaminate 
their intuitions concerning well- being. Others still may be being misled by an 
irrational fear of technology, feeling of disgust, or bias they possess in favour of 
preserving the status quo.29
These are all interesting suggestions. However, they seem to me not fully to 
account for our feelings here. When we keep in mind these important features, 
focus just on well- being, and set aside our fears, biases, etc.— all things that seem 
possible for many of us to do— we continue to feel that plugging in would not be 
best for a person.30
I want to suggest a different response. This is that hedonism might be com-
patible with the claim that plugging in would not be best for one. Indeed, hedo-
nism might offer the best explanation of why it would not be best for one to plug 
in. How could this be true? The answer, I believe, is that nozick’s machine might 
be unable to give one the most intense and diverse pleasures of all: the full range 
of the pleasures of love and friendship in the long run.
Consider what is necessary in order to experience these pleasures in real life. 
It is a familiar fact that if one’s close friend, partner, or family member, does not 
truly love one (where such love includes feeling real affection for one), then— 
even if this person thinks they truly love one, or is trying their hardest to— one’s 
interactions with them will be missing something important. Their behaviour 
toward and around one, both bodily and verbal, will be ‘off’ somehow. They 
will fail to say quite the right things, display quite the right facial expressions, or 
perform quite the right gestures or actions, at the right times, to make one feel 
as a close friend or loved one ideally should. They might, for example, be overly 
impatient with one, or, at different times, too patient. They might misread one’s 
emotional cues and so miss opportunities to comfort or amuse one. They might 
simply bore one. While it is possible they could fluke the right behaviours for a 
while, it is extremely unlikely they could do so in the long run. What’s more, all 
29. For a more detailed description of these responses, see Bramble (in press). See also Sum-
ner (1996), Hewitt (2010), Kolber (1994), De Brigard (2010), and Weijers (2014).
30. Some have suggested, intriguingly, that our intuitions here are merely the product of 
evolution or hedonic- conditioning, and so should be disregarded. See, for example, Crisp (2006), 
Silverstein (2000), Lazari- radek and Singer (2014), De Brigard (2010), and Weijers (2014). For some 
challenges for these suggestions, see Bramble (forthcoming).
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this could take place without one’s realising that anything was awry. It might 
take years, and the counsel of friends who do love one, to understand it. What is 
my point? Simply that in real life, the pleasures of love require love.
What about in a more controlled setting? Could a troupe of highly skilled 
actors produce the relevant behaviours (the ones required to give one the plea-
sures I am talking about)? Again, it is hard to imagine how they could. Con-
sider the character of Truman Burbank in the film The Truman Show, who from 
birth has been the star of his own reality TV show without knowing it. Truman 
is miserable because, while the actors around him are all at the top of their 
game, and their lines are carefully crafted by the brilliant Christof, he has never 
had contact with anyone who truly loves or cares about him.31 The moment he 
encounters somebody on the set of his TV show who is not acting, somebody 
who has real affection for him— a woman named Lauren— he is instinctively 
drawn to her. She seems to give him something that he has never before had— 
something experiential.
return now to nozick’s machine. It seems possible that, just as fake friends 
and a troupe of highly skilled actors could not be adequate to give one the full 
range of the pleasures of love and friendship in the long run, so too the experi-
ence machine might necessarily fall short. Since there is no- one either running 
the machine or inside it along with one who truly loves one, there is no- one in 
this whole setup who understands one in only the way that a true friend or loved 
one can— i.e., the way, I have suggested, that is required to behave in precisely 
the right ways around one in order to give one the pleasures of love.
If this is true, then a hedonist can say that the reason that plugging in is not 
best for one is that it would deprive one of the full range of the pleasures of love 
and friendship in the long run, some of which are so intense (in the sense of be-
ing pleasurable to a high degree) and diverse that their loss could not be com-
pensated for by any amount of other pleasures one could get in the machine.32
As further evidence of this explanation, consider that, for many of us, the 
main reason plugging in seems not best for one is that it would involve perma-
nent separation from other real conscious selves. Many of us would happily plug in 
all together to a ‘communal’ machine, in which we could each live whatever sort 
of life we wanted whilst continuing to interact with our existing friends and loved 
ones (who would occupy this virtual world along with us33). Similarly, it is com-
31. Christof claims to love him— but we can tell that this isn’t so by Christof’s willingness to 
allow Truman to remain in the TV program. In any case, Truman never comes into direct contact 
with Christof (until his moment of escape).
32. See Section 5 above for my reasons for thinking that the pleasures of love and friendship 
might include pleasures this intense and diverse.
33. The details of how such a communal machine would work are, needless to say, compli-
cated. I will not attempt to go into them here.
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mon for people to say that they would plug in to nozick’s machine if they had no 
friends or loved ones in the real world, or were facing a life of solitary confinement.34 My 
explanation offers a straightforward account of why these things are so. Perma-
nent separation from other real selves is so bad for one, on my view, because it 
necessarily has experiential consequences for one.
By contrast, it is unclear how rival explanations of why plugging in would 
not be best for one could account for the apparent central importance of remain-
ing in contact with other real selves. One might try to say— as nozick, for in-
stance, might— that permanent separation from other real selves is so bad for 
one because connection with reality is intrinsically good for one, and reality in-
cludes other real people. But why should it be just this one part of reality that is 
so vital for us to remain in contact with?
I want now to consider an important objection to the explanation I have pro-
vided. This is that I am simply being unimaginative. A sufficiently sophisticated 
machine could work out what behaviours were needed to give one the relevant 
pleasures.35
Perhaps this is right. Let’s be charitable and suppose that it is. In this case, 
I believe, it would be best for one to plug in to the machine. Is this an intuitive 
claim? I accept that it might not be. But this fact, it seems to me, does not tell 
all that strongly— if at all— against hedonism, since it is one thing to suppose or 
stipulate that the machine could work out the relevant behaviours, and quite an-
other to have some meaningful or clear grasp of how it could do so. It is only, I 
believe, if we were to have the latter sort of grasp that we would find it intuitive 
that it would be best for someone to plug in. While it is relatively easy to imag-
ine a machine’s delivering truly reality- quality experiences, not malfunctioning, 
etc., it is not so easy to imagine how a machine like nozick’s could be designed 
in such a way as to work out these behaviours. Without such a clear idea, our 
intuitions here are virtually worthless.36
As evidence of this, consider:
34. even nozick writes: “One of the distressing things about the experience machine, as de-
scribed, is that you are alone in your particular illusion. (Is it more distressing that the others do not 
share your “world” or that you are cut off from the one they do share?)” (1989: 107, my emphasis).
35. An anonymous reviewer suggests to me that the recent film Ex Machina clearly illus-
trates how an AI would be able to give one the pleasures of love. However, it is doubtful that the 
pleasures the AI depicted in this particular film gives the human protagonist are those of love or 
friendship, as distinct from those of lust and awe. Furthermore, even if it were plausible that she 
gives him some of the pleasures of love, it is by no means clear that she could give him the full range 
of the pleasures of love in the long run.
36. It may be easier to imagine the machine, on a particular occasion, fluking the relevant 
behaviours. In such a case, it actually seems to me fairly intuitive that it would be best for one to 
have plugged in. But, even here, it requires quite an imaginative feat to hold everything in one’s 
mind long enough to have an intuition that is worth anything.
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The Same- Experiences Machine. There is a machine that would give you 
the exact same future course of experiences that you would have if you 
were not to plug in. Here’s how it works: If you plug in, the machine will 
calculate the complete way that the universe would have gone had you 
not plugged in to it, including all the experiences, down to their finest de-
tails, you would have had.37 It then feeds you these very experiences over 
the same period of time that you would have had them for in the real 
world. note that upon entering, you will not remember having chosen to 
plug in. Indeed, you might believe that you have chosen not to plug in.
Unlike with nozick’s machine, it is quite clear how The Same- experience Ma-
chine could give one the full range of the pleasures of love and friendship in the 
long run (assuming determinism is true). now, ask yourself: Does it seem any 
worse for you to plug in to this machine than to remain in reality?38 I would 
suggest not. Intuitively, it makes no difference to one’s well- being whether one 
plugs in or not. I accept that not everyone will share this intuition. But, at the 
very least, I hope that the reader feels that it would be far more acceptable to 
plug into The Same- experiences Machine than a machine like nozick’s.3940
I want to conclude by showing how my response to nozick’s objection al-
lows us to respond to a related objection to hedonism, the Deceived Businessman. 
Here is the case (nicely told by Feldman):
The . . . businessman is happy because, as he thinks, his career is going 
well, he is respected in his community, and he has a loving family . . . 
[All] of his assumptions are false. [He] is in fact held in utter contempt by 
his colleagues, deeply deceived by his adulterous wife, and hated by his 
children. each has his or her reasons for engaging in the deception, but 
the result is the same: the businessman’s happiness is completely depen-
dent upon his widespread misapprehension of his circumstances. If he 
37. Assume that the universe is deterministic.
38. Again, it is important here to consider only what seems to be in your own interests, and 
not other matters like what would be best simpliciter.
39. It may be suggested that this is because, in The Same- experiences Machine, one would 
still have a connection to what would have been reality. But this is an odd claim, and would be 
quite different from nozick’s (that a connection with reality itself is intrinsically valuable for one).
40. What about a case where two individuals’ lives are experientially identical from birth to 
death, but where only one is connected to reality (suppose the experiences of one person’s life are 
somehow copied and played in their entirety, like a video tape, to another person)? (Such a case 
has recently been suggested by Crisp 2006; Hawkins 2015; and Lin in press). I confess I find it 
hard to have clear intuitions about such a case, mainly because I find it tempting to think that we 
would have here not two numerically distinct individuals, but rather just the one (for, it seems to 
me, there would be only one stream of experiences). I also have worries over whether one could 
just copy someone’s experiences in their entirety and play them to another in this way. Perhaps 
experiences of free choice, for example, are not duplicable in this way.
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knew the truth about his colleagues, his wife, and his children, he would 
be miserable. (2004: 41)41
The worry for hedonism is that, while this businessman is perfectly happy, he 
does not seem at all well off. At the very least, he seems worse off than somebody 
whose life is identical from the inside, but whose family does love him.
But it seems to me practically impossible to imagine this man’s family’s lack 
of love for him not impinging in various important ways on his experiences. no 
family could be that good at faking it (and certainly not for years). Genuine love 
manifests in all sorts of spontaneous actions, gestures, and expressions. While 
the deceived businessman might never suspect that his family does not really 
love him, and might even (in some sense) feel loved, the quality of his experienc-
es would almost certainly be affected. He would not be getting the full range of 
the pleasures of love and friendship, and moreover would likely be feeling pains 
of alienation or of failing to understand other people or the world around him.
Suppose that the man in question was severely autistic, and so (let us as-
sume) incapable of experiencing anything like the range of pleasures of love that 
you and I experience in our lives. In this case, whether or not his family really 
loves him might not affect his life from the inside one bit. now, ask yourself, 
does it still seem that he is made worse off by his family’s not really loving him? 
I would suggest not. There is a sense in which if his family really did love him, 
their love would be wasted on him.
7. The Resonance Constraint
Many philosophers accept something that has come to be known as the resonance 
constraint (on an adequate theory of well- being). According to this constraint, 
whatever is good for someone must resonate with or appeal to this particular 
person in some way. As Peter railton famously puts it:
What is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with 
what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he 
were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conception 
of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage 
him. (1986: 9) 42
This claim is now the standard reason in the literature to reject so- called objec-
tive list theories of well- being, on which things such as friendship, knowledge, 
41. See also Kagan (1994).
42. See also rosati (1996).
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achievement, etc., can be good for a person whether or not this person has any 
desire at all for them. How can achievement be good for somebody who cares 
nothing for it?
recently, a number of philosophers have suggested that the objection ap-
plies equally to hedonism. Hedonism, after all, it is noted, is a list theory with 
a very small list. How can a life of pleasure be good for those who care nothing 
for pleasure? Hedonism alienates these individuals from their good (whatever it 
may turn out to be).43
How should a hedonist respond to this objection? Some have argued that he-
donism can satisfy the resonance constraint. Heathwood, for example, suggests 
that hedonists can satisfy it by adopting an attitude- based theory of pleasure. He 
writes:
[I]f pleasure constitutively involves desire, then what is good for us, ac-
cording to hedonism, will automatically bear a connection to what en-
gages us, or resonates with us. (Heathwood 2016)
However, as I claimed in Section 4, hedonists can adopt an attitude- based 
theory of pleasure only at the cost of giving up the proper motivation for hedo-
nism.
There is, I believe, a better response: Oppose the resonance constraint. There 
are compelling counterexamples to it. Consider:
Testy Tom. It is 1964, and Beatlemania is sweeping the globe. Tom is a 
grumpy old man who disapproves of modern rock music. He has heard 
some of The Beatles’s music, and regards it as utterly without merit, and, 
moreover, liable to corrupt the youth. He desires not to hear it, and cer-
tainly not to enjoy it. nonetheless, his wife insists on playing it, and so 
Tom (who cannot easily leave the house due to an injury) must listen 
several times per week. He does not like this one bit. One day, to his ex-
treme annoyance, he finds himself tapping his toes and humming along 
to Please Please Me. He is enjoying The Beatles’s music. Is he glad? no, 
he is horrified!
Is Tom’s pleasure of listening to Please Please Me in any way good for him? 
Intuitively, yes. That is, at the end of the day, this pleasure will have made him 
better off in at least one respect in his life considered as a whole than he would 
have been if he had not heard and enjoyed this song. Of course, it might still 
have been wrong for his wife to impose it upon him. Moreover, it might have 
been worse on balance for Tom that he was made to hear this music, given the 
43. See, for example, Tiberius and Plakias (2010).
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stress or anxiety it has caused him. But none of this shows that it doesn’t make 
him better off in one respect.
Consider, next:
Disgruntled Dick. Dick is a retired military colonel who has renounced the 
pleasures of love. He considers such feelings to be weak and worthless. 
One day, his long lost daughter gets in touch and re- enters his life. He 
finds himself feeling glimmers of true closeness and love for the first time 
in his life. Is Dick glad? not one bit! He sincerely wishes, in every part of 
his being, that he did not feel these things.
Despite Dick’s unambiguous opposition to these pleasurable feelings, it seems 
possible that they could be the best things that ever happen to him.
Consider, finally, the pleasures of flow mentioned earlier (of, say, meditat-
ing, being immersed in playing tennis, listening absorbedly to a symphony or 
rock album, etc.), or the pleasures involved in dreams. These pleasures, it seems, 
cannot be known by us with sufficient clarity for our wanting them to be a nec-
essary condition of their being good for us. And yet they seem to have consider-
able value for us indeed.
It may be asked, if the resonance constraint is false, then why do so many 
philosophers find it plausible? Part of the reason, I suspect, has to do with the 
fact that, for many sorts of things, there is a sense in which we must like or want 
them if they are to be good for us. Take flavours of ice cream. There is no point in 
choosing peppermint if you dislike that sort of flavour (and, what’s more, would 
not even come to like it if you were to give it more of a chance). Similarly, if you 
don’t like horror movies, it is doubtful you would be well served by going to see 
one. But these cases, properly understood, are not cases of desires or preferences 
placing limits on what can be good for us. Talk of ‘liking’ and ‘disliking’ here 
seems rather to be elliptical for talk of what brings us pleasure and pain. In saying 
you dislike peppermint, you’re saying that it doesn’t taste good to you (affords 
you no pleasurable experience), and in fact, it tastes bad (affords you unpleasur-
able experience). In saying you don’t like horror movies, you’re saying you get 
no enjoyment from them. And so on. So, while there is a sense in which, in these 
special sort of cases (“matters of mere taste”, as they have been called44), one 
must like something if it is to be good for one, this is consistent with hedonism. 
Indeed, hedonism nicely explains why there is some truth in it.
Another part of the reason, I believe, that so many people are attracted to the 
resonance constraint has to do with the fact that, within certain limits, people 
ought to be allowed maximal freedom to pursue their desires or chosen con-
ception of the good. We should not impose ways of life on people, even if we 
44. See, for example, Sobel (2005).
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know that these ways of life would be highly pleasurable for those concerned. 
Perhaps, when it comes to some philosophers, their attraction to the resonance 
constraint lies in a commitment to this kind of anti- paternalism. They might, in 
other words, be confusing the idea that we should be allowed a great deal of 
freedom in choosing our own lifestyle with the idea that our attitudes determine 
what is good for us. But this is, to be sure, a confusion. The truth of hedonism 
would not entail that it is sometimes permissible to force people to do something 
just because it would be pleasurable for them.45
I conclude that a hedonist has a good reply available to The resonance Con-
straint objection— she should oppose this constraint.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided a new defense of hedonism about well- being. At 
the heart of this defense have been five main claims:
1.  That hedonism should be paired with a felt- quality, rather than an 
attitude- based, theory of pleasure and pain.
2.  That there is an important difference between the degree to which a 
pleasure is pleasurable and the ease with which one can introspect it.
3.  That diversity in our pleasures has a special value for us.
4.  That nozick’s experience machine might be unable to give one the 
full range of the pleasures of love and friendship in the long run (or 
at least that it is extremely hard to imagine how it could do so).
5.  That a hedonist should oppose, rather than attempt to satisfy, the 
resonance constraint.
We can sum up the version of hedonism I have defended as follows:
For any two individuals, S and S*, S was better off in some respect in her life 
considered as a whole than S* if and only if
(i)  S felt some kind of pleasurable phenomenology that S* did not feel, or 
some kind of pleasurable phenomenology that S* felt, but in a higher 
degree than S* felt it, or
45. Among the reasons for this is, as Mill famously pointed out, that such force is unlikely to 
lead to especially pleasurable outcomes.
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(ii)  S* felt some kind of painful phenomenology that S did not feel, or 
some kind of painful phenomenology that S felt, but in a higher de-
gree than S felt it.
The most fortunate lives, on this theory, are, roughly, those with a very great 
variety of highly pleasurable pleasures and very little variety of highly painful 
pains.
Why should we accept this theory? Because only it respects the experience 
requirement while having the resources to deal with the three major objections 
to hedonism.
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